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REAL-NAME REGISTRATION RULES AND THE FADING
DIGITAL ANONYMITY IN CHINA
Jyh-An Lee
†
 & Ching-Yi Liu
†
Abstract: China has implemented comprehensive online real-name 
registration rules, which require Internet users to disclose their identities.  Chinese 
national law has required most online service providers to implement real-name 
registration since 2012.  This article uses the real-name registration rules to illustrate the 
supremacy and limitations of the Network Authoritarian Model (NAM), an approach 
leveraging corporate resources for political surveillance and occasionally adopted by the 
Chinese party-state.  By addressing the evolution of real-name registration rules in China, 
this article illustrates the party-state’s gradual efforts in both eliminating cyberspace 
anonymity and etching Chinese characteristics on the architecture of the Internet.  
Although the Chinese government has faced serious challenges in enforcing the real-
name registration policy and current enforcement is far from satisfactory, China is not 
alone in promoting such a policy.  Major Internet companies, including Google, 
Facebook, and LinkedIn, have expressed similar interests in requiring users to register 
their real names.  Moreover, policymakers in developed and developing countries are 
exploring similarly themed regulations and China, therefore, may well be in the vanguard 
of the global movement for online real-name registration.  Nonetheless, requiring real-
name registration in China has not only created huge costs for Internet companies, but 
also given rise to fierce controversy associated with free speech, privacy, and law 
enforcement.  In this article, we identify several important legal and policy implications 
of the Chinese real-name registration policy.  We also illustrate the foremost predicament 
currently faced by the Chinese party-state in enforcing the policy.  This analysis argues 
that China may create a “spillover effect” in jurisdictions outside China as well as in the 
global Internet architecture. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Online real-name registration policies require the disclosure of the 
speaker’s identity with the aid of various methods, ranging from government 
regulation of Internet service providers (ISPs) to technologies embedded in 
communication infrastructure.  Promulgated under the Chinese 
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government’s philosophy of fostering a “responsible” Internet, the real-name 
registration rules have become one of the regulatory risks of doing business 
in China.  For example, in its annual report filed with the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Sina, a NASDAQ-listed company and one of 
China’s largest Internet companies, warned its investors that Chinese 
authorities might shut it down because its Twitter-like microblogging sites 
were in noncompliance with the Chinese government’s real-name 
registration rules.
1
  In order to maintain public order, China has enacted 
local and national laws requiring Internet users, especially bloggers and 
microbloggers,
2
 to register their real name and personal information with 
various ISPs that directly provide users with Internet access or services.
3
These regulations reflect the Chinese government’s position that individuals 
should be responsible for their online communications.  Nonetheless, this 
regulation has simultaneously led to fierce controversy and policy debate.
4
 As the Internet facilitates economic development, Chinese policy 
makers aim to channel its energy and creativity in ways that fit the Chinese 
governance model.  But what the Chinese party-state government is 
concerned about is the free flow of information which, enabled by digital 
technologies, may upset social stability.  Therefore, the government has 
carved out a unique approach to coping with this instance of the “dictator’s 
dilemma.”
5
  In order to control online information, the government has 
imposed strict duties on Internet companies or ISPs under the twin principles 
of “harmonious society” and “social responsibility.”
6
  Most Internet 
                                                     
1 Loretta Chao, Microblogs Survive Real-Name Rules—So Far, WALL ST. J.: CHINA REALTIME (Apr. 
30, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/04/30/microblogs-survive-real-name-rules-so-
far/?mod=google_news_blog. 
2 See, e.g., Li Shigong, Is Real-Name Registration Necessary for Micro-Blogs?, BEIJING REV. (Feb. 
2, 2012), http://www.bjreview.com.cn/forum/txt/2012-01/30/content_422194.htm. 
3 See infra Part III. A.; see also Kristen Farrell, The Big Mamas Are Watching: China’s Censorship 
of the Internet and the Strain on Freedom of Expression, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 577, 584–88 (2007) 
(analyzing China’s requirement that Internet users register their personal information).  
4 See, e.g., Fan Dong, Controlling the Internet in China: The Real Story, 18 CONVERGENCE: INT’L J.
RES. INTO MEDIA TECH. 403, 409 (2012) (indicating that the real-name registration system “has been 
vehemently opposed by scholars, netizens and industry people” in China); Hai Tang, Blogging in China: 
Freedom of Expression vs Political Censorship in Sexual and Satirical Blogs, 2 NETWORKING 
KNOWLEDGE: J. MECCSA POSTGRADUATE NETWORK 1, 4 (2009) (pointing out that the real-name 
registration policy “seems to be unacceptable and unpleasant to Chinese bloggers”). 
5 See, e.g., Johan Lagerkvist, Principal-Agent Dilemma in China’s Social Media Sector?  The 
Party-State and Industry Real-Name Registration Waltz, 6 INT’L J. COMM. 2628, 2629 (2012) [hereinafter 
Lagerkvist, Principal-Agent Dilemma].
6 See, e.g., Johan Lagerkvist, New Media Entrepreneurs in China: Allies of the Party-State or Civil 
Society?, 65 J. INT’L AFF. 169, 173 (2011) [hereinafter Lagerkvist, New Media Entrepreneurs in China].  
See also Ann Bartow, Privacy Laws and Privacy Levers: Online Surveillance Versus Economic 
Development in the People’s Republic of China, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 853, 853 (2013) (addressing the Chinese 
government’s effort to reconcile the two competing interests of maintaining effective government 
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companies have tamely abided by the government’s mandates and have 
cooperated with the government in enforcing Internet regulations.  In this 
way, the companies hope to continue extracting profit from the largest 
digital economy in the world.  Put differently, by taking advantage of the 
business sector’s profit-driven motives, the authoritarian government can 
easily leverage commercial power and corporate resources for online 
political censorship and surveillance.  This so-called “Network Authoritarian 
Model” (NAM) has strong Chinese characteristics.
7
  In the past decade, the 
Chinese government has successfully implemented the NAM via various 
measures, such as Internet filtering and strict Internet regulations.
8
  China’s 
implementation of the real-name registration rules can also be understood as 
an example of the network-authoritarian regulatory model.  
However, China’s implementation of the NAM is not without its 
challenges.  Because the strategy relies on compliance by private ISPs, it 
may be vulnerable when those private ISPs lack incentive or the ability to 
cooperate.  As China’s real-name registration rules have created 
insurmountable compliance costs, most Internet companies have hesitated to 
fully implement the real-name registration rules and the accompanying 
verification system.
9
  Such noncompliance has led to more uncertainties 
associated with the effective enforcement of the real-name registration 
policy.  Despite the success of the network authoritarian approach in 
controlling the flow of online information in the last decade, the 
uncertainties have created challenges for the continuance of this approach.
10
The implementation of the Chinese real-name registration policy 
presents an ideal opportunity to analyze the interaction between the 
various—sometimes competing—agendas associated with privacy, online 
free speech, and government control of the Internet.
11
  China is definitely not 
                                                                                                                                                              
surveillance and developing the nation’s knowledge economy); Id. at 869 (arguing that prevention of social 
unrest is one of the Chinese government’s main goals in controlling online communications); Id. at 894 
(“Much of the active governmental surveillance in China is directed at promulgating the CPC conception of 
social harmony.”). 
7 See e.g., SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING (AND WHY WE SHOULD 
WORRY) 32 (2011); Jyh-An Lee, Ching-Yi-Liu, & Weiping Li, Searching for Internet Freedom in China: A 
Case Study on Google’s China Experience, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 405, 426–27 (2013) [hereinafter 
Jyh-An Lee et al.]. 
8 See, e.g., Jyh-An Lee et al., supra note 7, at 419–23, 426–28. 
9 See infra notes 172–179 and accompanying text. 
10 Jyh-An Lee et al., supra note 7, at 426–28. 
11 Cf. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE 
INTERNET 148–49 (2007) (indicating the difficulties in balancing free speech, privacy, and reputation in the 
digital world); Jyh-An Lee, Regulating Blogging and Microblogging in China, 91 OR. L. REV. 609, 616–19 
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alone in opposing blanket digital anonymity. Policymakers in developed and 
developing countries alike have explored or implemented real-name 
registration rules for online activities.
12
  Major Internet companies, including 
Facebook and Google, have also advocated for real-name registration.   
Interestingly, most scholarly work on online anonymity and relevant policy 
issues thus far has not discussed real-name policies in depth.  The aim of this 
article is to bridge the gap between scholarly work on online anonymity and 
real-name policies.  By addressing the evolution of real-name registration 
rules in China, this article illustrates the party-state’s gradual efforts to 
eliminate cyberspace anonymity and etch Chinese characteristics on the 
architecture of the Internet.  This article also investigates relevant policy 
concerns, such as privacy and free speech, within the Chinese context and 
the effects of China’s real-name registration rules on the global Internet.  
Part II illustrates the anonymity afforded by the Internet, the social value of 
anonymity on the Internet, and the challenges online anonymity faces.  Part 
III details the evolution of the Chinese real-name registration policies and 
rules and their underlying rationales.  Part IV assesses the costs and 
feasibility of the real-name registration policy in terms of privacy, free 
speech, user behavior, and its enforcement by the government.  In 
conclusion, although the Chinese policy on real-name registration has raised 
serious concerns associated with privacy and free speech and created 
intricate enforcement problems, the international movement for real-name 
registration and China’s role therein will profoundly affect the future of the 
Internet.
II. PROBLEMS POSED BY ANONYMITY AND THE INTERNET
The biggest impact of the real-name registration rules is that 
individuals may no longer post writings and participate in discussions 
without fear of reprisal in the physical world.  While absolute anonymity 
may not exist in digital environments, a limited degree of anonymity may 
still be healthy for civil society.  By thoroughly eliminating online 
anonymity, real-name registration rules can fundamentally change the very 
nature of the Internet and, in particular, can do away with the Internet’s 
valuable contribution to civil society.  
                                                                                                                                                              
(2012) (discussing the Chinese approach to regulating online speech and privacy in the blogosphere) 
[hereinafter Jyh-An Lee, Regulating Blogging and Microblogging in China].
12 See infra notes 63–64, 223 and accompanying text. 
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Anonymity has been a longstanding, if incomplete, attribute of 
cyberspace.
13
  The Internet has long been viewed as a privacy-friendly space 
where mandatory user identification is the rare exception, not the rule.
14
However, such anonymity is by no means absolute.  In today’s virtual world, 
most people register information with third parties such as ISPs and domain-
name registries.
15
  Online intermediaries occasionally hold identifiable 
information.  Most Internet users are actually only “traceably” anonymous.  
Many Internet users share their identities with certain trusted parties while 
remaining effectively anonymous to those outside that trusted circle.  Put 
differently, “[t]raceable anonymity is for the most part what currently exists 
on the Internet”
16
 although “[m]any people don’t realize that their 
anonymous blogging or comments can be traced back to them.”
17
  It is 
therefore fair to say that very few individuals are actually untraceable in 
cyberspace and neither anonymity nor pseudonyms guarantee true 
untraceability.
18
Under this architecture, 
[T]he key is for the law to allow the unmasking of anonymous 
people when they engage in harmful speech about others. But 
people shouldn’t be unmasked too readily.  The law thus must 
draw a careful line between when it is appropriate to unmask 
any anonymous speaker and when it isn’t.
19
For this reason, “John Doe” lawsuits in the United States have become a 
compromise between online anonymity and accountability.
20
  Similarly, 
China’s policy of real-name registration has to strike a balance when it is 
necessary to unmask an anonymous speaker.  
                                                     
13 See, e.g., Bryan H. Choi, The Anonymous Internet, 72 MD. L. REV. 501, 503 (2013). 
14 See. e.g., PAUL BERNAL, INTERNET PRIVACY RIGHTS: RIGHTS TO PROTECT AUTONOMY 237–38 
(2014). 
15 SOLOVE, supra note 11, at 147 (“[When] a user communicates over the Internet, her IP address is 
logged. For any session of Internet use, the ISP typically has information that links a particular customer 
with her IP address.”). 
16 Id. at 146.  
17 Id. at 147. 
18 See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog & Frederick Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 4 (2013).  See also BERNAL, supra note 14, at 238 (claiming that untraceability is hard to achieve 
and justify). 
19 SOLOVE, supra note 11, at 147. 
20 See, e.g., Chesa Boudin, Publius and the Petition: Doe v. Reed and the History of Anonymous 
Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 2140 (2011).  
6 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 25 NO. 1
In the United States, the First Amendment’s freedom of speech 
guarantee has long been extended to protect anonymous speech.  However, 
the scope of that constitutional protection has been the subject of much 
debate.
21
  Consequently, as long as anonymity is expressive in its nature, 
regulating online anonymity will have to overcome the problems of 
constitutionality.
22
  Because the nature of the Internet makes it difficult to 
trace online speakers, some legal scholars argue that anonymity is an 
essential protection for dissidents
23
 and indispensable for democratic 
processes as it allows minorities, whistleblowers, and other marginalized 
members of society to step forward and speak about matters of justice 
without fear of repercussions.
24
  In addition, substantial research shows that 
it is easier for people to freely express their views online rather than offline 
because they believe identification is more difficult in the virtual world.
25
As noted by Danielle Keats Citron, “anonymity can be essential for some 
people to speak the truth about themselves and the world as they see it . . . .  
Examples abound of the importance of anonymity for commentary on 
politics, culture, and social matters.”
26
Anonymity is particularly significant for democratic decision-making 
processes insofar as it permits politically active individuals to express a 
given viewpoint while avoiding any association with the viewpoint.  In other 
words, anonymity can be seen as a shield against the tyranny of the 
majority.
27
  Anonymity strengthens the expression of viewpoints while 
concealing the identity of the person expressing his or her viewpoints.  
Though U.S. courts have held that anonymous expression is protected under 
                                                     
21 See id.
22 See, e.g., Susanna Moore, The Challenge of Internet Anonymity: Protecting John Doe on the 
Internet, 26 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 469 (2009); Jason M. Shepard & Genelle Belmas, 
Anonymity, Disclosure and First Amendment Balancing in the Internet Era: Developments in Libel, 
Copyright, and Election Speech, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 92 (2012).
23 See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Regulation of Computing and Information Technology: Flood 
Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L.
& COM. 395, 429 (1996). 
24 See, e.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous 
Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1574 (2007).  
25 See, e.g., Shirley S. Ho & Douglas M. McLeod, Social-Psychological Influences on Opinion 
Expression in Face-to-Face and Computer-Mediated Communication, 35 COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 
190–207 (2008).
26 DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 60–61 (2014). 
27 See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).  
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free-speech principles,
28
 the issue is now focused on the proper standard for 
a qualified right to online anonymity.
29
As Professor Martin Redish notes,
[T]hough they are not identical, the right against compelled 
speech possesses the same constitutional DNA as the right of 
anonymity.  Much as it has protected the right against 
compelled speech, the Supreme Court has generally protected a 
speaker’s right to keep his identity private . . . .  [I]n certain 
ways the First Amendment argument for anonymity is even 
stronger than the rationale for a right not to speak.
 30
To a government, anonymity poses obstacles to law enforcement.
31
  In 
addition, it has long been argued that online anonymity can promote 
irresponsible online comments and harmful behavior.
32
  For example, by 
defining anonymity as being unable to “trace the source of an electronic 
message,”
33
  Ann Wells Branscomb, a pioneer in the discourse on the 
relationship between security and privacy, advocates a balance between a set 
of rules governing online communications and responsible behaviors in 
cyberspace.
34
  She proposes that private parties may try to regulate 
anonymity in electronic forums they control.
35
  More recently, Ari Ezra 
Waldman points out that not only is the image of a free and anonymous 
online world wrong, but our online selves are also “traceable and 
increasing[ly] identifiable as the extensions of our physical selves.”
36
Therefore, he proposes that we should reorient the way we think about our 
online activities and rights, emphasizing privacy and free speech instead of 
anonymity.
37
                                                     
28 See, e.g., id. at 342–43.   
29 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn from John Doe?, 50 B.C.
L. REV. 1373, 1376–78 (2009). 
30 MARTIN H. REDISH, THE ADVERSARY FIRST AMENDMENT: FREE EXPRESSION AND THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 160–61 (2013).  
31 See, e.g., Choi, supra note 13, at 536–37.
32 See, e.g., id. at 539. 
33 Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First 
Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1641 (1995). 
34 Id. at 1641–45. 
35 See Branscomb, supra note 33. 
36 Ari Ezra Waldman, Durkeim’s Internet: Social and Political Theory in Online Society, 7 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 345, 348 (2013). 
37 Id. at 386. 
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Anonymous speech can benefit both speakers and audiences.   
Recognizing potential benefits, Professor Redish persuasively notes that the 
“rejection of a right of anonymity arguably undermines both speaker-centric 
and listener-centric models of free expression.”
38
  When “viewed in this 
manner, the constitutional interest in protecting anonymity appears to be 
even more powerful than the constitutional interest underlying the well-
established right not to speak at all.”
39
  In addition, anonymity is an 
empowering tool with which speakers can level arguments against majority 
opinions,
40
 making it possible for speakers to associate with a marginalized 
segment of the population and thereby helping them self-realize without 
worrying about tarnishing their personal image or reputation.
41
  Furthermore, 
anonymous speakers can escape stereotyping based on ethnicity, race, 
gender, or other personal characteristics.  In this way, speakers ensure that 
the audience will judge their arguments solely or largely upon its 
anonymously delivered substance.  In other words, anonymity “allows 
people to be more experimental and eccentric without risking damage to 
their reputation.”
42
Moreover, since mandating the disclosure of identifying information 
or registration of real names can directly or indirectly hamper expressions of 
unpopular views, the purpose of protecting anonymous speech is to 
empower individual speakers to counter illegitimate government practices.
43
As A. Michael Froomkin points out, “the debate about anonymity . . . is in 
effect a debate about the degree of political and economic freedom that will 
be fostered, or tolerated, in a modern society.”
44
  Prohibiting the use of tools 
or technologies that enable anonymity will exacerbate the fundamental 
imbalance of power between individuals and their government. 
For a number of reasons, anonymity can also benefit audiences.  
Anonymity confers on audiences the ability to engage in relatively 
                                                     
38 REDISH, supra note 30, at 161 (emphasis in original). 
39 Id.
40 See, e.g., Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Unmasking Jane and John Doe: Online Anonymity and the 
First Amendment, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 405, 413 (2003). 
41 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–464 (1958).
42 SOLOVE, supra note 11, at 140 (citing Gary T. Marx, Identity and Anonymity: Some Conceptual 
Distinctions and Issues for Research, in DOCUMENTING INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY 311, 316 (Jane Caplan & 
John Torpey eds., 2001)). 
43 See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Government Motive in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996) (“[A]pplication of First Amendment law is best 
understood and most readily explained as a kind of motive-hunting.”); see also Jed Rubenfeld, The First 
Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001). 
44 Froomkin, supra note 23, at 401–02. 
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uninhibited information seeking, which can promote greater variety in the 
marketplace of ideas by creating a swell in demand for otherwise seldom or 
marginally sought-out material.
45
  More importantly, anonymity can 
promote the distribution of valuable speech and the ease with which 
audiences can access such speech.
46
  Audiences also benefit from anonymity 
insofar as it grants them more room to seek answers to potentially shameful 
or embarrassing questions.
47
  Finally, as with anonymous speakers, 
anonymous audiences can escape or minimize the chilling effects that 
stereotypes and stigmas have on an individual’s effort to seek out 
information.
48
  In short, anonymity for audiences, as well as for speakers, 
can benefit the whole of society.
49
Despite all the benefits of anonymity, words can still cause harm
50
 and, 
therefore, legal regulation of harmful speech is sometimes appropriate.
51
  It 
is unreasonable to assert that unfettered anonymous speech is harmless.  
Anonymous speakers are separated from any immediate consequences of 
their speech, making them feel safe from retaliation despite having spread 
defamatory or harassing speech.
52
  In addition, from an information 
acquisition standpoint, anonymous speech may be less valuable than 
identifiable speech due to both the unverifiability of sources of anonymous 
speech
53
 and the audience’s difficulty in determining whether any self-
interest or bias lies behind a particular instance of anonymous speech.
54
  Put 
differently, as the U.S. Supreme Court recognized, there is an inherent 
tension between transparency and anonymity.
55
  Some prominent free speech 
scholars have argued that most information providers in traditional 
                                                     
45 Choi, supra note 13, at 524–25.  
46 See id. at 552.
47 Froomkin, supra note 23, at 408.  
48 See Choi, supra note 13, at 524–25.  
49 Froomkin, supra note 23, at 408–09.
50 See generally RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND
(2004). 
51 See, e.g., JON B. GOULD, SPEAK NO EVIL: THE TRIUMPH OF HATE SPEECH REGULATION 66–67 
(2005). 
52 See, e.g., Margot Kaminski, Real Masks and Real Name Policies: Applying Anti-Mask Case Law 
to Anonymous Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 815, 827–28 (2013).
53 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE
L.J. 855, 862–63 (2000). 
54 Id.
55 See, e.g., Boudin, supra note 20, at 2172–73. 
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information marketplaces have had to abstain from anonymous speech and 
thus shoulder the responsibilities associated with transparency.
56
While anonymity has tremendous intrinsic value, its harm lies in its 
ability to cloak bad behavior.  As Daniel Solove points out, “anonymity 
allows people to escape accountability for their words, but this comes at a 
cost—the loss of authorship credit under one’s real name.”
57
  Anonymity 
also makes harassment and stalking easier than ever.
58
  However, the history 
of free speech protection shows us that attempts to regulate against harmful 
anonymity are often overbroad and eventually devolve into censorship of 
perfectly legitimate expressions.  The constitutional protection of free 
speech requires “breathing space” for protected speech to flourish.  Even 
assuming speech sometimes gives rise to harmful consequences, blanket 
identity-registration requirements will result in a chilling effect by deterring 
anonymous speech and are consequently incompatible with the very idea of 
free speech.
59
  Therefore, asking whether the government can impose a 
blanket ban on anonymity is a meaningful question that has become 
increasingly significant as the proliferation of online dissenters and offline 
revolutionaries has led governments around the world, particularly booming 
Internet economies such as China, to adopt online real-name policies.
60
III. REAL-NAME REGISTRATION POLICY IN CHINA
Online real-name registration policies function to facilitate traceability 
or prohibit anonymity
61
 and have gained wide popularity in governments 
from all corners of the globe.
62
  For example, South Korea enacted real-
name laws in 2007, requiring all online users to verify their identities by 
submitting their Resident Registration Numbers (RRNs) to ISPs.
63
  In 
                                                     
56 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing Law,
35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 972 (2007). 
57 SOLOVE, supra note 11, at 139. 
58 See, e.g., Nathaniel Gleicher, Note, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard,
118 YALE L.J. 320, 324 (2008).
59 See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 539 (1945); Watchtower Bible v. Village of Stratton, 
536 U.S. 150, 165–66 (2002).  
60 See, e.g., Eric S. Fish, Is Internet Censorship Compatible with Democracy?: Legal Restrictions of 
Online Speech in South Korea, 10 ASIA-PAC. J. ON HUM. RTS. & L. 43, 47–50 (2009); John M. Leitner, To
Post or Not to Post: Korean Criminal Sanctions for Online Expression, 25 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J. 43,
53–55, 64–68 (2011)ġŜhereinafter Leitner, To Post or Not to Post].
61   See infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
62 See infra note 223 and accompanying text. 
63 See Timothy B. Lee, South Korea’s “Real Names” Debacle and the Virtues of Online Anonymity,
ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 15, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/08/what-south-korea-can-teach-
us-about-online-anonymity/.  
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Germany in 2011, Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich advocated real-
name policies in the wake of the Norwegian mass shooting.
64
  Given online 
anonymity’s implications for law enforcement and social order, it was 
unsurprising when China decided in 2012 to expand its regulation of the 
Internet, requiring microblog and other Internet services users to perform 
real-name registration.
65
  This part provides a historic overview of China’s 
local and national real-name registration rules, followed by the policy 
rationales and criticisms of those rules. 
A. Evolution of the Chinese Real-Name Registration Policy 
The Chinese government expressed its interest in establishing a real-
name registration Internet policy as early as 2003, when it ordered cyber 
cafes to collect customers’ identification information.
66
  The purported 
policy goal of this real-name identification requirement was to fight crime 
and to protect minors.
67
  Thereafter, the government conducted real-name 
registration trial runs in a number of major Chinese cities, though not all of 
them were successful.
68
  For instance, in 2006, the Beijing administration 
failed to implement a real-name registration scheme for bloggers because of 
strong protest from users, news media, and high-tech industries.
69
  Similar 
frustration associated with local-government efforts to enact real-name 
registration rules surfaced in Xia Men.
70
  In early 2009, the local legislature 
in Hangzhou passed a real-name registration regulation, mandating that 
users provide their true identities when posting information online or when 
playing online games.
71
  Nevertheless, the city government eventually 
                                                     
64 See id.
65 See infra notes 87–89. 
66 See Jonathan Ansfield, China Web Sites Seeking Users’ Names, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/world/asia/06chinanet.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; see also Fan 
Dong, supra note 4, at 409 (noting that the real-name system “has been gradually forced onto webmasters 
and internet café visitors.”). 
67 Henry L. Hu, Real Name Systems in Chinese Cyberspace: Authentication, Privacy and State 
Capacity, 4 PEKING U. J. LEGAL STUD. 207, 215, 235 (2013) [hereinafter Hu, Real Name Systems].
68 See e.g., Fan Dong, supra note 4, at 409; King-wa Fu, Chung-hong Chan & M. Chau, Assessing 
Censorship on Microblogs in China: Discriminatory Keywords Analysis and the Real-Name Registration 
Policy, IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING, May–Jun. 2013, at 43 [hereinafter King-wa Fu et al.]; Leitner, To Post 
or Not to Post, supra note 60, at 68–69. See also Trina K. Kissel, License to Blog: Internet Regulation in 
the People’s Republic of China, 17 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 229, 252–53 (2007) (explaining how local 
and provincial officials in China have also used their authority to require individuals using BBSs, chat 
rooms, and IM services to use their real names when posting messages or chatting online). 
69 See, e.g., JOHAN LAGERKVIST, AFTER THE INTERNET, BEFORE DEMOCRACY: COMPETING NORMS 
IN CHINESE MEDIA AND SOCIETY 56 (2010) [hereinafter LAGERKVIST, AFTER THE INTERNET]; Lagerkvist, 
Principal-Agent Dilemma, supra note 5, at 2637; Ansfield, supra note 66. 
70 Hu, Real Name Systems, supra note 67, at 224. 
71 See Ansfield, supra note 66. 
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decided against enforcing the regulation due to widespread objections.
72
Since then, the Chinese government has become more cautious in seeking 
the private sector’s support for real-name registration.
73
In August 2009, in order to comply with “secret” government orders, 
several news portals, including Sina, NetEase, and Sohu, began to require 
that new users provide their real names and identification numbers.
74
  In 
February 2012, in order to comply with a measure issued by the Beijing 
Municipal Government,
75
 China’s four primary microblog companies—Sina, 
Sohu, NetEase, and Tencent—set a March 16, 2012 deadline for users to 
identify themselves by their real names.
76
  Currently, all microblog, or weibo,
users must register using their true identities, including their real names, 
government-issued ID numbers (i.e., the national identification number),
77
and mobile phone numbers.
78
  Although microbloggers are able to use 
nicknames or pseudonyms on their homepage, they cannot hide their real 
names from either the microblog companies or the government.
79
Unregistered users, while still able to browse microblog posts, are not 
allowed to post content.
80
  While Chinese bloggers no longer enjoy the same 
level of anonymity that existed prior to the regulatory changes, the 
government justified these changes as a means of tamping down on 
antagonistic speech.
81
The Chinese government has made the reduction of anonymity in 
cyberspace a major policy goal, proposing and enacting a number of stricter 
                                                     
72 Id.
73 LAGERKVIST, AFTER THE INTERNET, supra note 69, at 56.  See also Kay Hearn, The Management 
of China’s Blogosphere Boke (Blog), 23 CONTINUUM: J. MEDIA & CULTURAL STUD. 887, 891 (2009) 
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74 See, e.g., Ansfield, supra note 66. 
75 See, e.g., Covington & Burling LLP, China Enacts New Data Privacy Legislation, E-ALERT:
GLOBAL PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY (Jan. 11, 2013), at 2, http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/83ff413a-
af68-4675-850e-a0f54533d149/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/240e4b51-6450-4403-8cfeb0cea77c83 
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76 See, e.g., BERNADETTE H. SCHELL, INTERNET CENSORSHIP: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 116 (2014). 
77 See, e.g., David Caragliano, Why China’s “Real Name” Internet Policy Doesn’t Work, THE 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/why-chinas-real-name-
internet-policy-doesnt-work/274373/; Reuters, China Considers Requiring Real Names, Government ID 
Cards, to Sign Up for Internet Access, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 26, 2012, 9:08 AM), http://www.nydaily 
news.com/news/world/china-require-real-internet-access-article-1.1227414; The Power of Microblogs: 
Zombie Followers and Fake Re-tweets, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 17, 2012), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/21550333 [hereinafter The Power of Microblogs]. 
78 See, e.g., King-wa Fu et al., supra note 68, at 43. 
79 See id.; The Power of Microblogs, supra note 77. 
80 King-wa Fu et al., supra note 68, at 43. 
81 See, e.g., Kevin Gregg, “Text ‘Revolution’ to Vote”: Social Media’s Effect on Popular Consent 
and Legitimacy of New Regimes, 31 B.U. INT’L L.J. 315, 332 (2013). 
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registration requirements.  For example, in 2005, all universities and 
colleges in China began to require users of Bulletin Board Systems (BBSs)
82
to provide their real names.
83
  In 2007, the central government issued an 
administrative notice ordering all online-game service providers to integrate 
mandatory real-name registration in their products.
84
  According to China’s 
Internet Society Chairwoman Hu Qiheng, the government’s goal is to 
“achieve a state of ‘no anonymity’ in cyberspace.”
85
  Mr. Chen Wang, the 
highest-ranking government official responsible for online information in 
China, expressed a similar opinion that China needed to create a real-name 
system that reduced or eliminated anonymity in cyberspace.
86
As a consequence, in December 2012, lawmakers in the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress passed a new law entitled 
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on 
Strengthening Online Information Protection (Online Information Decision), 
mandating that “network service providers should require their users to 
supply true identification information when signing [an] agreement to 
provide them with website access, fixed line telephone, mobile phone access, 
or allow them to post information via the network.”
87
  The Online 
Information Decision has two important legal implications.  First, it elevates 
China’s real-name policy to the level of national law.
88
  Second, it covers a 
wide range of online services because most Internet enterprises provide 
services for gaining “website access” and for “post[ing] information via the 
                                                     
82 BBSs are the most popular online forum in China.  They can be operated by individuals, private 
organizations, or government agencies.  See, e.g., Xiao Qiang, The Internet: A Force to Transform Chinese 
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Jensen & Timothy B. Weston eds., 2007). 
83 Hu, Real Name Systems, supra note 67, at 217–18. 
84 Id. at 226. 
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86 U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SECURITY REV. COMM’N, 111TH CONG., 2010 REP. at 226, 228 (2nd Sess. 
2010), http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/ default/files/annual_reports/2010-Report-to-Congress.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2015). 
87 Quangguo Renda Changweihui Guanyu Jiaqiang Wangluo Xinxi Baohu De Jueding (ޘഭӪབྷᑨ
ငՊޣҾ࣐ᕪ㖁㔌ؑ᚟؍ᣔⲴߣᇊ) [Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress on Strengthening Online Information Protection] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Dec. 28, 2012, effective Dec. 28, 2012), art. 6, (China), http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2012-
12/28/content_2301231.htm [hereinafter Online Information Decision]. 
88 See, e.g., Stephen Lawson, China Orders Internet Users to Disclose Their Real Names, PCWORLD
(Dec. 29, 2012), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2023521/china-orders-internet-users-to-disclose-their-
real-names.html;  Joe McDonald, China Real-Name Registration Is Now Law in Country, HUFF POST (Dec. 
28, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/28/china-real-name-registration_n_2373808.html.  It 
should be noted that the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress is probably the most 
important national legislative body in China.  It has the power to interpret the Constitution and enact and 
amend the laws.  See, e.g., BING LING, CONTRACT LAW IN CHINA 26–27 (2002);  GUIGUO WANG, The Legal 
System of China, in CHINESE LAW 1, 6–8 (Guiguo Wang & John Mo eds., 1999). 
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network.”
89
  Therefore, the real-name registration requirement has become a 
legal obligation not only for providers of blogging services, but also for most 
other online service providers in China.
90
  The government has recently 
expanded this requirement to users of instant messaging applications, 
including WeChat, the most popular instant-messaging tool in China.
91
Moreover, in 2015, after several years of consideration,
92 
the Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology finally implemented real-name 
registration requirements.
93
  Mobile phone SIM card buyers now must have 
their ID card examined by electronic ID readers.
94
  Those who fail to register 
may run the risk of having their phone numbers suspended.
95
On July 6, 2015, the National People’s Congress in China released a 
draft of the “Cybersecurity Law” which includes more detailed rules 
associated with online real-name registration.
96
  Article 20(1) of the draft is 
identical to the network service providers’ obligation of collecting users’ 
identification information in the aforementioned Online Information 
                                                     
89 Online Information Decision, supra note 87, at art. 6.   
90 See, e.g., Covington & Burling LLP, supra note 75, at 2 (pointing out that the real-name 
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128, 132 (2013) (noting that the rule is applied to all Internet platforms). 
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http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-08/08/content_18274337.htm [hereinafter Cao Yin, IM Rules]
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reduce online rumors); China Tightens Control on Instant Messaging Services, BBC NEWS (Aug. 7, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-28694890. 
92 See U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SECURITY REV. COMM’N, supra note 86; Reuters, supra note 77; see 
also Ansfield, supra note 66 (“[F]urther regulations of the same nature also appeared to be in the 
pipeline.”).  
93 See, e.g., Vivienne Zeng, China Enforces Real-Name Registration for Phone Users, HONG KONG 
FREE PRESS (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.hongkongfp.com/2015/09/02/china-enforces-real-name-
registration-for-phone-users/. 
94 Id.; Staff Reporter, Real-Name SIM Registration to Be Enforced in China Sept 1, WANT CHINA 
TIMES (Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20150828000033 
&cid=1103 [hereinafter Real-Name SIM Registration to Be Enforced in China Sept 1].
95 See, e.g., Zeng, supra note 93;  Real-Name SIM Registration to Be Enforced in China Sept 1,
supra note 94. 
96 See, e.g., Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, The “Chilling Effect” of China’s New Cybersecurity Regime,
FOREIGN POL’Y: TEA LEAF NATION (July 10, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/10/china-new-
cybersecurity-law-internet-security/; Nectar Gan, Why China’s Draft Cybersecurity Law Has Chilling 
Implications for the Internet and Multinationals: Proposed Legislation Steps up Data Protections as Well 
as Government Controls Online, S. CHINA MORNING POST (July 9, 2015), http://www.scmp.com/news/ 
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Decision.
97
  Article 53 of the draft imposes legal liability for service 
providers’ violations of the real-name registration obligation, including fines 
ranging from RMB 50,000 to 500,000 and the suspension of business 
licenses.
98
  Given past legislative behavior, it is very likely that the draft will 
be passed into law with very few changes.
99
B. Policy Basis for China’s Real-Name Registration Rules 
Why does the Chinese government so actively promote its real-name 
registration policy?  The official explanation is that real-name registration 
rules can ensure a healthier and safer Internet and protect public interests 
and social order from illegal content, such as libel, fraud, pornography, 
rumors, and vulgarity.
100
  The government’s strict control of the Internet 
environment is based on the belief that online criticism and other harmful 
language online may have destructive influences on society.
101
  For example, 
baseless and hysterical rumors spreading on the Internet may be a serious 
problem for a government that extensively plans and controls citizens’ 
activities.
102
  As such, by requiring real-name registration, the government 
not only effectively regulates malicious and anonymous accusations,
103
 but 
also maintains harmony in society—at least in theory.  Official 
proclamations endorsing the real-name registration system are not novel in 
China.  As the Chinese Internet Society Industry Self-Discipline Committee 
secretary-general Yang Junzuo recently stated, by reducing such personally 
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note 88 (quoting the clarification made by Le Fei, deputy director of the Chinese legislature’s Legal Work 
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Internet”).
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2011/09/05 /technology /naming-names-on-the-internet.html 
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devastating attacks as fraud and libel, the real-name registration system can 
eventually help to build a “harmonious Internet ecology.”
104
The preamble of the Online Information Decision states that the 
legislation is intended to “ensure Internet information security, safeguard the 
lawful rights and interests of citizens, legal entities or other organizations, 
and safeguard national security and public interests.”
105
  The function of the 
real-name registration is to assist in the elimination of online malicious 
speech, pornography, and “unfounded rumors.”
106
  It should be noted that 
the Chinese government is not the only government to ascribe its real-name 
registration policy to public interests and order in the digital world.  The 
South Korean government, which built the first national real-name 
registration system,
107
 similarly emphasized the desirability of a more 
responsible and respectful culture for online expression.
108
  Therefore, it is 
not surprising that the Chinese government has occasionally mimicked the 
South Korean approach to justifying the official real-name registration 
rules.
109
  Recently, some Chinese government officials again declared that 
the real-name registration requirement is an important policy tool for 
battling rising Internet crime.
110
  Other pro-government commentators even 
claim that the requirement is one of several “efforts to combat terrorism,” 
pornography, and violence.
111
Critics claim that the real-name registration rules are a tool that the 
Chinese government uses to prevent Internet users from criticizing 
government officials or publicizing government corruption.
112
  Without 
online anonymity, a significant number of Chinese Internet users would 
likely hesitate to criticize the government for fear of government 
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272 (2011); Leitner, To Post or Not to Post, supra note 60, at 63–64. 
109 Ansfield, supra note 66. 
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retribution.
113
  Therefore, the real-name registration policy may have chilling 
effects on speech, especially speech critical of public officials and other 
sensitive topics.
IV. EVALUATING THE CHINESE REAL-NAME REGISTRATION POLICY
China’s real-name registration policy may be critiqued from a variety 
of different policy angles.  Some critiques label the policy an infringement 
on citizens’ fundamental rights.
114
  Others hold that the policy can neither 
achieve its original goals nor benefit from effective enforcement.  
Researchers have conducted studies exploring Chinese citizens’ perception 
of the government’s attempts to develop a real-name registration policy but 
the results of these studies vary significantly.
115
  According to a Shanghai-
based survey conducted by Chinese scholar Zhao Yawen, a majority of 
respondents were supportive or very supportive of the real-name registration 
rules.
116
  A survey conducted by the semi-governmental organization China 
Internet Network Information Center found similar results.
117
  By contrast, 
surveys conducted on sites like Sina indicate that a majority of users 
opposed the real-name registration policy.
118
  This part of the article will 
analyze policy issues, ranging from privacy, free speech, and impact on 
users’ behavior to effective enforcement of China’s real-name registration 
policy.
A. Privacy 
Anonymity is a form of privacy protection that may facilitate privacy 
violations.  In other words, anonymity can preserve privacy by allowing 
people to speak freely without having to submit to public identification.  
Anonymity can also undermine privacy by allowing people to more easily 
invade the privacy of others.  More specifically, digital invasion of personal 
privacy stemming from disclosure of non-public or potentially sensitive 
personal information has been pervasive given that anonymous authors 
enjoy the freedom to express themselves without fear of any negative 
personal consequences.  As the tensions between anonymity and 
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accountability and between privacy and free speech demonstrate, the choice 
is not as simple as one between freedom and constraint.  Rather, it is “a 
choice that involves freedom on both sides.”
119
For law enforcement, anonymity is a tool with which criminals evade 
the public’s detection of their illegal activities.  This aspect of anonymity is 
an obstacle to law enforcement and compels governments around the world 
to consider whether they should regulate anonymity-promoting technology 
or even whether they should try to stamp out anonymity altogether.
120
  It is 
not difficult to imagine that the more untraceable the various forms of online 
speech become, the stronger the state’s interest in policing this speech 
becomes. 
Efforts to banish anonymity from the digital world promotes 
surveillance
121
 and chills protected speech, raising the question of whether 
governments’ blanket ban on online and offline anonymity will become a 
reality.  This question deserves considerable attention.  Although the real-
name registration policy described above is designed to enhance accuracy in 
online information, it may cause unintended—or intended—social costs.  
Among other costs, a decline in privacy is a central concern surrounding 
efforts to implement China’s real-name registration scheme.
122
  The 
implementation of real-name registration rules results in online platforms’ 
need to acquire users’ real names and other personal data, in turn raising the 
risk of privacy infringement.
123
Moreover, the private sector in China has long contended that without 
reliable technology for privacy protection, sound implementation of a 
rigorous real-name registration policy is impossible.
124
  South Korea’s 
experience may best exemplify how real-name registration rules can harm 
privacy.  South Korean Internet users were required to enter identifying 
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121 See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: 
Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 425 (2012). 
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information into the relevant websites for access.
125
  However, due to a 
severe security breach in which hackers stole the identification numbers of 
thirty-five million Internet users, South Korea abandoned its real-name 
registration policy in 2011.
126
  In the Constitutional Court of Korea, justices 
heard complaints that South Korea’s Real Name Verification System had 
unnecessarily exposed South Korean Internet users to Internet fraud.
127
  The 
Court eventually ruled that the real-name registration rule was 
unconstitutional in part because it posed an unnecessary risk to users’ 
personal data.
128
Although privacy protection in South Korea may differ from that in 
China, China has experienced a rapid increase in identity theft.
129
  Therefore, 
its real-name registration policy may trigger privacy concerns as serious as 
those witnessed in South Korea.  Moreover, many defenders of the frequent 
argument that online anonymity is a form of privacy protection
130
 argue that 
China’s real-name registration rule might “erode online privacy”
131
 or even 
“necessarily intrude on people’s privacy.”
132
  As China has enacted a series 
of privacy laws
133
 and strengthened its privacy protection in recent years,
134
privacy risks caused by real-name registration rules will no doubt become a 
difficult legal issue in the near future.  
B. Free Speech 
Commentators have claimed that real-name registration regulations 
harm free speech.
135
  It is easy to understand that in a repressive or 
authoritarian society, anonymity enables dissidents to express anti-
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establishment views without fear of retaliation.
136
  It is equally important to 
allow anonymity in a democracy as anonymity—again, by diminishing the 
threat of retaliation—can persuade whistleblowers to come forward.
137
According to Professor Redish, the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested 
that:
[A] prohibition on anonymity almost inevitably chills 
unpopular or controversial expression . . . . [A] choice against 
allowing anonymity—unlike the choice not to permit silence 
under certain circumstances—may well reduce the sum total of 
information and opinion contributed to public debate . . . .  In 
cases where a speaker seeks anonymity, the speaker is 
necessarily seeking to communicate, albeit anonymously.
138
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a tradition of anonymous 
pamphleteering
139
 and it has “construed the First Amendment right of 
anonymity to apply beyond the directly expressive context.”
140
A chill on speech is a central concern raised by opponents of real-
name registration policies.
141
  If a government effectively enforces such a 
policy, targeted monitoring may prevent users from expressing ideas 
beneficial to society.
142
  This stifles not only online creativity, but also 
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political speech.
143
  Researchers have observed that some recent prospective 
microbloggers have given up completing the website registration process.
144
Preliminary empirical research suggests that, in China, the number of 
politically sensitive microblog posts significantly declined after the 
government’s enforcement of real-name registration.
145
  Moreover, the 
Chinese government has used its censorship mechanisms in tandem with 
real-name registration to block speech by notable dissidents, such as Ai 
Weiwei.
146
  Nonetheless, the long-term effect of the real-name registration 
policy remains unclear. 
Acknowledging these types of considerations, the Constitutional 
Court of Korea ruled that the country’s real-name registration rule was 
unconstitutional primarily because its benefits were not sufficient to justify 
its significant restrictions on citizens’ right to free speech.
147
  Such reasoning 
may provide valuable insights into the Chinese context. 
 As free speech is protected by the Chinese Constitution
148
 and is 
essential to online activities, Chinese citizens have begun to recognize its 
value.
149
  Although the Chinese government has been criticized for 
suppressing free speech, the Chinese courts have begun to consider various 
policy factors in relation to free speech cases.
 150
  Therefore, the free speech 
implications of China’s real-name registration rules merit considerable 
attention.
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Balancing the above considerations, the effective elimination of 
online anonymity in China sacrifices constitutional free speech protections 
for exaggerated concerns.
151
  Consequently, real-name registration rules can 
delay the public’s emerging awareness of free speech in China.  If a 
government firmly values the right to anonymity, any move to adopt these 
policies should proceed with the utmost caution.  
C. Impact on Users’ Behavior 
If real-name registration rules restrict both political speech and 
creativity, can these rules restrain libel, rumor, and other hostile speech?  
The justification of real-name registration rules is relevant to whether 
authorities can effectively enforce the law to protect citizens from 
defamation, cyberbullying, and the like.  In countries without similar 
nationwide policies (e.g., the United States), governments appear to be 
capable of detecting anonymous troublemakers in cyberspace.
152
  This is 
why Internet law scholars have long argued that “[all] of the good that 
comes from monitoring could be achieved while protecting privacy.”
153
Clearly, real-name registration policies are not the only approach for holding 
Internet users accountable for their online actions.  What it takes to achieve 
some type of monitoring, without resort to real-name registration, could be 
merely certain built-in mechanisms capable of ensuring traceability.  
Accordingly, the primary justification for real-name registration loses much 
of its persuasiveness because less intrusive means of tracing online users 
exist.
154
According to empirical studies conducted in South Korea, real-name 
registration rules did not change user behavior.  Online defamation was as 
common prior to the enforcement of those rules as it was after their 
abolishment and the rules did little to improve the online reputations of 
victims.
155
  The Constitutional Court of Korea confirmed the fact that the 
government’s real-name registration requirement also failed to decrease 
illegal online content.
156
  The South Korean example and others like it may 
have important implications for China.  If real-name registration rules 
neither significantly change user behavior associated with hostile speech nor 
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meaningfully strengthen protections for private reputations, their 
justifications would obviously be inadequate.  The same argument can be 
applied in China as well.  Recent microblogging activities in China suggest 
that online activism has not decreased significantly since the Chinese 
government established its real-name registration rules in 2012.
157
  Therefore, 
it is doubtful whether the rules can achieve the original policy goals by 
substantially shaping Internet users’ behavior.   
D. Enforcement 
Enforcement is an important issue for the Chinese real-name 
registration policy because government monitoring of individual Internet 
users promises to be extremely costly and difficult.
158
  In this section, we 
will analyze the difficulties and challenges faced by the Chinese government 
in enforcing an effective real-name registration scheme. 
1. Level of Enforcement 
There are numerous reports that neither the Chinese government nor 
ISPs have strictly enforced real-name registration requirements.  The 
Chinese media has reported that Chinese microblog users who have not 
verified their identities can still post messages online.
159
  Indeed, Internet 
companies, including Sina, have admitted that they still let users post 
information on their websites without real-name registration.
160
  This 
revelation implies that neither the government nor ISPs have strictly 
enforced the real-name registration policy.  On the one hand, ineffective 
enforcement is likely inevitable because successful implementation of any 
identity verification mechanism on such a large scale, involving so many 
users, will necessarily take a long time.
161
  However, another explanation is 
possible: to avoid a steep decrease in microblog traffic, the Chinese 
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government may be hesitant to immediately enforce its own real-name 
registration rules.
162
The Chinese government must take into account the consequences of 
strictly enforcing its own policy.  A government shutdown of non-compliant 
blogging platforms could trigger large-scale protests from Chinese Internet 
users and garner widespread, unwanted attention from the international 
community.  Recently, the Chinese government has ultimately decided to 
abandon strict Internet regulations due to extensive public discontent.
163
  For 
example, in 2009 the Chinese government attempted to stipulate that all 
computers made and sold in China be preinstalled with the content filtering 
software Green Dam Youth Escort.
164
  This project was abandoned because 
of strong opposition from the local Internet community, the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, and the European-American Business Council.
165
  Furthermore, 
some local governments’ initiatives in implementing real-name registration 
rules also failed as a result of public objections.
166
  Therefore, if a platform is 
shut down over noncompliance and triggers mass complaints from China’s 
online community, the effective enforcement of the policy may ironically 
run counter to China’s original policy goal: to build an ideal online 
environment characterized by public order and trust. 
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2. Internet Companies’ Cooperation with China’s Real-Name 
Registration Policy 
Online service providers are important intermediaries in the efforts by 
the Chinese government to enforce its own Internet regulations.
167
  In order 
to extract profit from the world’s largest and fastest-growing Internet 
economy,
168
 most Internet companies in China have considerable incentive 
to cooperate with the government in enforcing its regulations.
169
  This 
scenario reflects how the party-state controls the online world via the NAM.  
As numerous Internet companies are highly profitable in China,
170
 the NAM 
seems quite suitable for regulating the Internet in China.  However, this 
regulatory approach has not been working as planned since providers began 
to hesitate to comply.
171
  The section below will discuss the main obstacles 
to Internet companies’ cooperation with the government in implementing the 
real-name registration rules, which include the high costs of cooperation, 
services provided by foreign websites, and the lack of an effective 
verification mechanism. 
i. High Cost of Cooperation  
From the service provider’s perspective, the costs of implementing the 
real-name registration policy are enormous.  These costs stem not only from 
the heavy burden of “identification verification,” but also from the huge 
information security costs associated with protecting personal information 
from theft.
172
  It is unsurprising that Sina has resisted the real-name 
registration rules from the very beginning.
173
  The company reported in its 
2012 regulatory filing that it had yet to implement the scheme because of 
“existing user behavior, the nature of the microblogging product, and the 
lack of clarity on specific implementation procedures.”
174
  Other microblog 
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operators are facing similar difficulties.
175
  Likewise, primary mobile 
operators, including China Telecom, China Unicom, and China Mobile, have 
all expressed difficulty in implementing the registration policy because of 
their large user bases.
176
  Commentators indicate that the real-name 
registration policy has been unsuccessful mainly because ISPs have been 
reluctant to invest in the implementation of the registration.
177
China’s past failure with enforcing real-name registration of cyber 
café customers helps to explain why the high costs borne by private 
companies would eventually hinder cooperation with the government.
178
Private companies that require real-name registration may be disincentivized 
to cooperate with the policy if they find that the requirement costs them 
significant numbers of customers.
179
  Without the assistance of ISPs or other 
Internet companies, successful implementation of the real-name registration 
policy may be impossible.  Concerning the insurmountable costs faced by 
Internet companies, avoiding misaligned incentives has become one of the 
Chinese government’s main challenges in executing its current registration 
rules.
ii. Circumventing Foreign Websites 
It is always challenging for national governments to regulate content 
or online activities hosted by foreign websites because the digital 
environment is borderless.
180
  The limited regulatory reach of nation states 
creates impediments for the implementation of real-name registration rules 
as well.  South Korea is one of the few countries that adopted a real-name 
registration policy before China, but it abandoned its efforts partly over the 
difficulty of enforcement.
181
  To make matters worse for the South Korean 
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venture, some international companies, such as YouTube, have decided to 
refrain from full compliance with the policy and, in fact, redirected local 
users to their international websites to circumvent the national registration 
rules.
182
Conversely, although some commentators argue that the Chinese real-
name registration policy may lead Internet users to foreign providers,
183
 the 
circumvention issue is not a major problem for China because the country 
has successfully built the world’s most sophisticated Internet filtering system, 
the so-called Great Firewall, to block foreign websites.
184
  In the long run, 
Internet companies serving Chinese users cannot dodge the Great Firewall 
and redirect users to foreign websites.
185
  In other words, the Internet 
filtering techniques constitute a shield with which the Chinese government 
can ensure the effective enforcement of the real-name registration policy.  A 
quick observation of the Chinese market for social media will lend further 
credence to the viewpoint that the South Korean circumvention problem is 
highly unlikely to occur in China.  As the Chinese government blocks or 
filters most popular social media websites (including Facebook, YouTube, 
and Twitter),
186
 Chinese Internet users generally rely on the services of 
domestic Internet companies.
187
  Most of these domestic companies operate 
only in the Chinese market and are accustomed to collaborating with the 
authoritarian government in order to turn a profit.
188
  Domestic Internet 
companies, such as Tencent, have declared that they will support the real-
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name registration policy and have urged their users to respect the law.
189
  As 
political correctness is the key to operating a successful Internet business in 
China, domestic Internet companies can ill afford to offend the party-state 
by redirecting users to websites abroad.  Although redirecting users to 
foreign websites may not be a serious problem for implementing the policy 
in China, other factors, such as the high costs of cooperation and the absence 
of an effective verification mechanism, may still prevent Internet companies 
from implementing such a policy. 
3. Effective Verification 
From a practical perspective, implementing this policy takes 
considerable resources.  Policymakers and government authorities need to 
design a mechanism for verification of real-name registrations.
190
  Otherwise, 
the rules will, in digital environments, prove to be hollow pronouncements 
backed by idle threats.  South Korea’s experience exemplifies how a 
verification mechanism works: the government required that private portals 
direct their users to a public website, where they would certify their identity 
by entering their national identification numbers into the website.
191
  By 
contrast, the Chinese government has neither established a concrete 
implementation plan nor designated an organization to play the role of 
enforcer.
192
  Furthermore, China does not have reliable technology capable 
of effectively executing online identity verification.  In fact, a few years ago, 
China attempted to develop a system allowing local police to register and 
authenticate the real names of Internet café customers.
193
  However, this 
system proved to be ineffective because the overall surveillance program 
failed to gain the necessary cooperation of cyber cafés.
194
  Though the 
Chinese government is noted for its stringent, technologically adept 
regulation of online activities,
195
 it has not yet developed technology capable 
of carrying out the real-name registration policy. 
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In the case of China, online marketplaces have responded to the rules 
in a way unintended by the Chinese government.  Savvy Internet users are 
perhaps easily circumventing current registration mechanisms in China and 
elsewhere.
196
  Enterprising underground businesses have been selling fake 
verification information to purchasers who wish to remain anonymous while 
logging into microblog accounts.
197
  If a microblogger is willing to shell out 
extra money to an illegal underground business, the blogger can 
inconspicuously register with a microblog website.  In China, some Internet 
users have used so-called “ID Card Generator” software to generate ID card 
numbers for Internet users who do not want to disclose their identities.
198
  In 
light of this reality, enforcement of the registration policy is far from 
satisfactory.  If the market for fake identity increases to a critical mass and 
the government truly commits itself to successfully enforcing the real-name 
registration policy, authorities must either devote more and better resources 
to enforcement of the policy or enact a new policy altogether.  Otherwise, it 
is very likely that the current, ineffectually enforced policy will remain only 
a nominal threat to most Chinese Internet users. 
V. THE FUTURE OF DIGITAL ANONYMITY AND THE INTERNET
With recent advancements in digital technologies and the law, legal 
scholars have recognized that the right to anonymity should not be 
absolute.
199
  The network itself is traceable, user identity cannot be hidden 
perfectly,
200
 and real-name registration policies are not the only strategy for 
controlling online activities.  The Constitutional Court of Korea has rightly 
pointed out that less restrictive policies for controlling online activity are 
available.
201
  Therefore, the argument that real-name registration policies are 
uniquely suited to the task of policing the Internet is quite doubtful.  One 
scholar argued that a user’s “identity [can] be requested where needed and 
appropriate . . . .”
202
  Under this approach, the main issue would be whether 
requiring an Internet user’s identity information is necessary and appropriate.  
Given the aforementioned concerns, real-name registration may not be an 
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ideal approach in the digital sphere; even scholars advocating for a reduction 
in online anonymity find that such extensive real-name registration rules are 
an unacceptable approach to Internet regulation.
203
Professor Lawrence Lessig, arguably one of the most important 
commentators on Internet law, once proposed that “we should certainly 
architect cyberspace to ensure anonymity.”
204
  Nonetheless, China’s real-
name registration policy is pushing the Internet in a direction opposed by 
Lessig: the elimination of online anonymity.
205
  This endeavor may 
profoundly reshape the architecture and norms of the Internet in China and 
around the world.
206
  After all, China has become a major worldwide cyber 
power
207
 and there is no justifiable reason to conclude that the country’s 
real-name registration policy is incapable of influencing the global Internet. 
 Although China has failed to implement its registration rules in the 
short term, these rules may have important policy implications for global 
Internet governance.  The Chinese government’s NAM has leveraged private 
commercial power and corporate resources to regulate the Internet
208
 and, in 
doing so, regulated the Internet in a more effective and economical way.
209
It is possible that the Chinese government may collaborate with key players 
in the Internet industry to further advance the real-name registration policy.  
Some Internet companies may realize that adhering to the policy will 
eventually work toward their own corporate benefit.
Though laws in some countries, such as Germany, protect anonymous 
or pseudonymous use of Internet services,
210
 a number of major social media 
companies, such as Google, Facebook, and LinkedIn, have expressed 
interest in urging users to register with real names.
211
  Google has announced 
                                                     
203 See Brenner, supra note 199, at 147–48; Choi, supra note 13, at 537–38. 
204 LESSIG, supra note 130, at 197. 
205 See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. 
206 Hu, Real Name Systems, supra note 67, at 234. 
207 See, e.g., Jyh-An Lee, The Red Storm in Uncharted Waters: China and International Cyber 
Security, 82 UMKC L. REV. 951, 963–65 (2014). 
208 See, e.g., Jyh-An Lee et al., supra note 7, at 426–28. See also Lagerkvist, New Media 
Entrepreneurs in China, supra note 6, at 172 (describing the increasing public-private cooperation in 
regulating online content in China). 
209 See, e.g., Jyh-An Lee et al., supra note 7, at 426–27. 
210 See, e.g., Juhi Tariq, The NSA’s Prism Program and the New EU Privacy Regulation: Why U.S. 
Companies with a Presence in the EU Could Be in Trouble, 3 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 371, 380 (2014); Anne-
Marie Zell, Data Protection in the Federal Republic of Germany and the European Union: An Unequal Playing 
Field, 15 GERMAN L.J. 461, 480–82 (2014) (introducing German courts’ decisions regarding whether 
Facebook’s real-name policy violates German Telemedia law). 
211 See, e.g., REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE 
FOR INTERNET FREEDOM 150–51 (2012); Marvin Ammori, The “New” New York Times: Free Speech 
JANUARY 2016 REAL NAME REGISTRATION RULES 31 
that it retains the right to disable accounts whose users are not using their 
real names
212
 whereas Facebook has already deactivated some accounts 
registered under pseudonyms or fake names.
213
  While Google recently lifted 
its real-name requirement for Google+ users,
214
 Facebook’s explanation for 
its real-name policy is that this policy can prevent users from “act[ing] 
abusively towards other members of [the] community . . . .”
215
Those major 
Internet companies’ recent preference for real-name registration
216
 only 
strengthens the argument that real-name registration has the potential to 
become the norm in the global Internet environment.  
Google and Facebook have also been developing effective real-name 
verification technologies,
217
 which the Chinese government lacks.  Google 
and Facebook are, of course, key Internet platforms.  Thus, both their 
enthusiastic development of real-name registration architecture
218
 and their 
extraordinary influence on Internet governance
219
 will perhaps shape the 
global Internet environment in ways that favor China’s implementation of an 
effective real-name registration policy.  The more incentives there are for 
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Internet companies to adopt real-name registration, the more likely China 
will be able to put such a policy into action.
If such endeavors are justified under public policy rationales, such as 
building a more civil Internet
220
 or combating terrorism,
221
 then China may 
be set to shape a very different Internet architecture.  Moreover, the Chinese 
approach to eliminating digital anonymity by implementing effective real-
name registration rules may have a strong “spill over” effect on global 
Internet governance and regulations.
222
  China is not alone in promoting such 
policies.  Other countries, including Iran, Kazakhstan, Syria, and Saudi 
Arabia, have enacted laws eliminating user anonymity in the online world.
223
Some individuals and enterprises also believe that the Internet would be 
more civil if Internet users were identifiable online by their real names.
224
For example, Hans-Peter Friedrich, Interior Minister of Germany, is of the 
opinion that the identities of bloggers should be transparent so that the 
bloggers can be held accountable for their posts.
225
  Politicians in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland have made similar proposals.
226
  From a comparative 
perspective, a real-name registration requirement may also be designed as a 
safe harbor for ISPs to avoid potential liability, rather than a strict legal 
obligation with Chinese characteristics.
227
It is true that limiting anonymity might be an effective strategy to 
combat abusive online behavior.  But should Internet gatekeepers be legally 
obliged to require real names?  Although some commentators argue that the 
benefits of anonymity are often outweighed by its costs to civility,
228
 one can 
just as reasonably argue that: 
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[W]ithout anonymity, domestic violence and sexual assault 
victims might not join online survivors’ groups for fear that 
their abusers might discover them.  LGBT teenagers might not 
seek advice from online support groups about coping with 
bullying if they had to worry about their peers learning of their 
sexual orientation . . . .  With inflexible real-name policies, 
society may lose a lot and gain too little.
229
The ongoing development of various real-name registration policies 
suggests that a strong “spill over” effect on our online lives is unavoidable.  
One should not overlook the conventional constitutional wisdom that 
anonymous speech, including the use of pseudonyms, is a powerful tool of 
political debate.
230
  As such, this constitutional tradition merits an extension 
to encompass the Internet, the most powerful communication tool for the 
marketplace of information and ideas to date invented by human beings.  
Although commentators appear to agree that online anonymity is not 
absolute, we argue here that real-name registration policies should never 
serve as the main approach to controlling the Internet.  Even American 
scholars promoting the application of civil-rights law to online harassment 
cases have argued that “real name policies are not guaranteed to deter bad 
actors.  Determined harassers may be able to figure out a way to disguise 




Online anonymity poses new challenges for regulators and raises new 
complex legal dilemmas that elude quick and easy solutions under existing 
law.  China’s real-name registration policy represents a significant response 
to this challenge and also exemplifies—with strong Chinese 
characteristics—the NAM.  This policy has raised serious concerns 
associated with privacy and free speech.  Moreover, the Chinese government 
has encountered intractable enforcement problems arising from a 
pronounced misalignment of incentives for ISPs and a lack of reliable 
technology for real-name verification.  Nonetheless, it is still too early to 
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assert that the policy is doomed to fail.  In fact, support for this type of 
policy has progressively expanded to other countries and the global Internet 
industry.  Regardless of how the laws, norms, and Internet architecture of 
anonymity evolve and interact with each other in the global digital sphere, 
the international movement for real-name registration and the role of China 
therein will profoundly affect the future of the Internet. 
The findings and insights in this article strongly suggest that societies 
should establish a more balanced regulatory architecture including various 
real-name registration policies enforced both by governments and by 
Internet companies.  Legal solutions to the problems of online incivility and 
illegality should take shape sooner rather than later and should protect online 
victims without threatening free-speech rights and privacy rights enjoyed by 
Internet users.  Ideally, the new legal solutions would not expand the 
existing categories of unprotected speech by turning protected speech into 
unprotected speech.  At the same time, the question as to how Internet 
intermediaries, such as ISPs, will play their role in the changing digital 
landscape needs to be answered very carefully so as not to encroach upon 
the fundamental privacy rights of Internet users.  Any redesign of regulatory 
architecture that functions solely to meet the requirements of real-name 
registration policies can significantly reshape online norms in ways that 
strengthen authoritarian governance of the Internet.  Therefore, while the 
public and private sectors work together implementing real-name 
registration policies, we must be wary of a more authoritarian governance of 
the Internet becoming the default of our online lives.  This governance can 
easily lack transparency and accountability and condemn certain kinds of 
positive online behaviors.  Our approach should work to balance these 
considerations. 
